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GIVING UP THE GHOST: ALASKA
BAR ETHICS OPINION 93-1 AND
UNDISCLOSED ATTORNEY
ASSISTANCE REVISITED
HOWARD BURGOYNE RHODES*
ABSTRACT
Twenty years ago, the Alaska Bar Association adopted Ethics Opinion No.
93-1 which permitted attorneys to “ghostwrite” pleadings and provide other
undisclosed services to pro se litigants. The goal of this ethical guidance was
to enable attorneys to assist low-income individuals who could not otherwise
afford representation. Ethics Opinion No. 93-1 construed “ghostwriting”
broadly as an attorney’s undisclosed assistance to a pro se client whether by
providing legal advice or drafting pleadings or other documents. This Note
argues that, despite the moral allure of its theoretical justifications,
ghostwriting is unnecessary, provides little demonstrable benefit to pro se
litigants, and potentially conceals the unethical practice of law. Ghostwriting
may also confuse the interactions between judges and pro se litigants in a
way that works against the pro se party’s interests. Specifically, this Note
argues that ghostwriting may cause judges to misapprehend pro se litigants’
legal understanding and to withdraw prematurely the solicitude those judges
are otherwise required to give. Therefore, the Alaska Bar Association should
revise its guidance on ghostwriting to require attorneys providing unbundled
services to append their Alaska Bar Number on their submissions. This
requirement would discourage abuses, enable judges effectively to manage pro
se litigants, and still permit experimentation in the unbundled legal market.

INTRODUCTION
For several decades, Alaska’s bench and bar have debated how best
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to respond to the increasing number of individuals who represent
themselves in court because they believe the services of a lawyer are
unaffordable, unavailable, or undesirable. Pro se litigants present a
number of challenges to state court systems: they frequently have
difficulty managing procedural requirements and articulating their legal
claims; they require judges and courthouse staff to instruct them on
basic matters that lawyers handle with dispatch; and they often dropout of or fail unnecessarily in the pursuit of justice due to a lack of
knowledge and appropriate resources, thus creating a massive pool of
unmet legal needs. The increasing number of such litigants, therefore,
raises a question: can courts and the legal profession devise a way to
provide these citizens with effective “access to justice” while
maintaining a neutral and efficient tribunal and upholding the values of
the legal profession?
Twenty years ago, the Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee led
the State’s effort to respond to this problem by issuing Opinion No. 93-1
(“Alaska Op. 93-1” or the “Opinion”).1 Alaska Op. 93-1 permitted
attorneys to “ghostwrite” the filings of pro se litigants under certain
conditions as a means of enabling attorneys to assist low-income
individuals who could not otherwise afford full representation.2 The
Opinion did not define “ghostwriting,” but seemed to construe it
broadly as an attorney’s undisclosed assistance to a client who proceeds
pro se, regardless of whether this assistance takes the form of writing
pleadings or providing legal advice.3 In either case, the attorney neither
enters an appearance in the litigation nor signs the documents he helps
to prepare. The Opinion operated under an implicit assumption that a
lawyer’s “ghostwriting” services to a pro se client would amount to less
than traditional, full-service representation.4 In this respect, Alaska Op.
93-1 anticipated by more than a decade the Alaska Supreme Court’s
adoption of a revised Rule 1.2(c) of the Alaska Rules of Professional
Conduct (“ARPC”), which officially permitted Alaska attorneys to limit

1. Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 93-1 (1993) [hereinafter Alaska Op.
93-1], available at https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/365.html.
2. Id. at 1.
3. See id. at 1–2 (discussing a lawyer’s provision of “legal services” and
using classes taught by non-profit legal assistance organizations as an example).
4. In the litigation context, full-service representation is typically defined
as charging a client a single fee to handle all aspects of the litigation. Jeffrey P.
Justman, Capturing the Ghost: Expanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to Solve
Procedural Concerns with Ghostwriting, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1246, 1247 n.6 (2008)
(citing Helen Hierschbiel, The Ethics of Unbundling: How to Avoid the Land Mines
of “Discrete Task Representation,” OR. ST. B. BULL (July 2007), available at
http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/07jul/barcounsel.html).
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the scope of their representation of clients.5
Since 1993, Alaska has used a two-pronged approach to address the
challenges of increased pro se litigation: (1) providing direct
administrative assistance to such litigants, at least in the area of family
law, and (2) formally encouraging attorneys to provide “unbundled”
legal services that are more affordable for low-income clients.6 The
Alaska Court System provides direct assistance through its Family Law
Self-Help Center (“FLSHC”), which supplies forms, instructions, and
neutral administrative guidance.7 The FLSHC also refers clients to the
Alaska Bar Association’s list of lawyers who provide unbundled legal
services.8
The basic terms for providing unbundled services are set by ARCP
Rule 1.2(c), which states that “[a] lawyer may limit the scope of the
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances
and the client consents after consultation.”9 Lawyers who provide
unbundled legal services modify the terms of the traditional attorneyclient relationship with respect to litigation by creating a contract to
complete discrete tasks for a client on a fee-for-service basis rather than
charging a retainer fee for managing an entire case.10 Such unbundled
5. See ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 1544.
6. See
Pro
Se
Resources
by
State,
AM.
B.
ASS’N,
http://americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services/resources/pro_se_unb
undling_resource_center/pro_se_resources_by_state.html (last updated Dec. 14,
2011) (outlining limited representation and family-law self-service centers as the
two options available); Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1 (encouraging attorneys
to cooperate with organizations providing unbundled services).
7. Self-Help Center: Family Law, ALASKA CT. SYS., http://courts.alaska.gov/
selfhelp.htm (last updated Aug. 9, 2013). According to the FLSHC’s Director,
Stacey Marz, the Center receives an average of 7,500 client contacts every year.
Telephone Interview with Stacey Marz, Dir., Family Law Self-Help Ctr. (May 14,
2013).
8. Finding
a
Lawyer,
ALASKA
CT.
SYS.,
http://courts.alaska.gov/shclawyer.htm (last updated July 15, 2003).
9. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c); see ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO.
1544 (effective Oct. 15, 2004) (officially emending ARPC R. 1.2(c) to require that
the limitation be reasonable under the circumstances and subject to the consent
of the client and emending Alaska R. Civ. P. 81 to permit the “limited
appearance by counsel”). The ARPC were rescinded in their entirety and new
rules adopted in 2009, but Rule 1.2(c) was unchanged. ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO.
1680 (effective Apr. 15, 2009).
10. Unbundled Legal Services – Information, ALASKA BAR ASS’N,
https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/unbundled_legal_services_1246.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 11, 2013); Stephanie Kimbro, Law a la Carte: The Case for
Unbundling Legal Services, GP SOLO, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
gp_solo/2012/september_october/law_a_la_carte_case_unbundling_legal_servi
ces.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2013); Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case
Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 453, 454 (2011). Unbundled services are only truly novel in the litigation
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services purport to address problems of under-representation by
providing limited services for limited cost, thus “servicing clients within
their ability to pay.”11
Unbundled services bear a clear—though controversial—
relationship to the goal of providing greater legal support for lowincome persons. What is less clear is why a state bar or court system
should permit attorneys providing those services to do so from behind a
veil of anonymity. The Alaska courts have never addressed
ghostwriting, but federal courts that have opined on the issue have been
almost uniformly critical of the practice.12 Critics of ghostwriting suggest
both that it is contrary to various rules of professional conduct and that
it undermines some of the fundamental requirements of a self-regulating
profession, such as transparency and responsibility.
This Note argues that the Alaska Bar Association should revise its
guidance in Alaska Op. 93-1 to disentangle the ability of an attorney to
provide unbundled services from the ethical license to remain
anonymous. Specifically, this Note asserts that the Alaska Bar should
amend its current guidance to require that any attorney-assisted filing
be explicitly identified as such (e.g., by appending “Prepared with the
Assistance of Counsel” along with the attorney’s Alaska Bar number),
though the attorney’s name need not be disclosed. This would bring the
Alaska Bar’s ethical guidelines into conformity with the opinions of the
Florida,13 New Hampshire,14 and New York City15 bar associations. The
recent action of the Florida Bar Association deserves special
consideration because it is the only state bar to reverse its position on

arena. See id. at 461 n.32 (citing Fern Fisher-Brandveen & Rochelle Klempner,
Unbundled Legal Services: Untying the Bundle in New York State, 29 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1107, 1108–09 (2002)) (noting that “unbundled legal services” are not new
except in the litigation arena).
11. See Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling Legal Services: Servicing Clients within
Their Ability to Pay, 40 JUDGES’ J. 15, 15–16 (2001) (noting popular belief that
lawyers are unaffordable and that unbundling can make legal services
affordable).
12. See Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’
Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 285 n.73 (2010) (collecting cases
critical of the practice).
13. Florida State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 79-7
(Reconsideration) (2000) [hereinafter Florida Op. 79-7], available at
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBETOpin.nsf/ca2dcdaa853ef7b88525672800
4f87db/8cbbba193ca2133185256b2f006cac97?OpenDocument.
14. N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Unbundled Services – Assisting the Pro Se
Litigant, N.H. B. ASS’N, (May 12, 1999), available at http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/
PEA5-99.pdf.
15. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial
Ethics, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/Ethics/
eth1987-2.htm.

RHODES_V10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013

GIVING UP THE GHOST

12/6/2013 12:24 PM

235

ghostwriting after holding an inquiry of county court judges in the
state.16
In support of this view, this Note advances three main arguments:
(1) a lawyer’s ability to provide unbundled legal services to low-income
clients—and thus, theoretically, increase “access to justice”—does not
depend upon his ability to remain undisclosed; (2) ghostwriting has
shown little demonstrable benefit to pro se litigants and may actually
hinder a judge’s ability to manage her obligations to pro se litigants
effectively; and (3) ghostwriting’s marginal benefits do not outweigh its
potential costs to professional integrity.

I. ALASKA OP. 93-1, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, AND THE RISE OF PRO SE
LITIGATION
The Alaska Bar Association’s ethics opinions are initiated in
response to inquiries from Alaska attorneys who confront novel or
unclear ethical issues in their practices.17 Alaska Op. 93-1 was drafted in
response to an inquiry from a family law attorney who had a large
number of low-income clients who needed professional assistance with
child support modification motions and could not afford to retain
counsel.18 The attorney inquired whether it was ethical to provide this
limited service without entering an appearance in the litigation.19 Alaska
Op. 93-1 does not indicate how much the attorney was paid for this
service, nor whether the service was offered singly or as part of a menu
of services from which the client could choose as the litigation
progressed.20 Nevertheless, the Alaska Bar Ethics Committee concluded
that as long as an attorney clearly informed her client of the limitations
and risks of limited legal services, and conducted herself in accordance
with all the relevant standards of professional conduct, she need not
disclose her role in preparing filings to the court.21 The Alaska Bar Board
of Governors adopted the opinion in March of 1993.
Alaska Op. 93-1 and the situation to which it responded were not,
of course, conceived in a vacuum. Since the 1970s, the Alaska Bar, along
with every other state bar in the country, has dealt with an increasing
number of pro se litigants entering the court system. Studies from the
1990s note dramatic numbers of such litigants, especially in the context
16. See Florida Ethics Op. 79-7, supra note 13 (reversing previous position).
17. Telephone Interview with Steve Van Goor, Bar Counsel, Alaska Bar
Ass’n (Feb. 7, 2013).
18. Id.; Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1.
19. Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1.
20. See id. (not addressing pay or the menu issue).
21. Id.
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of family law.22 More recent data from Anchorage courts handling
family law cases indicate similar numbers. Since 2009, for example, 37 to
43% of the contested divorce and custody cases in Anchorage courts had
two unrepresented parties.23 In that same period, between 26 and 29% of
these family law cases had only one represented party.24 Though reliable
data is difficult to obtain, recent law review articles on pro se litigation
suggest that, even outside the realm of family law, the number of
unrepresented litigants nationally is rising.25
This increase in the number of self-represented litigants casts doubt
on whether the legal profession is adequately fulfilling its duty of
meeting the public’s needs for legal services: a troublesome problem for
state bar associations.26 Public-spirited members of the bar have long
recognized the so-called “representation gap” between the poor and the
well-off.27 Some commentators believe that the rise of pro se litigation is

22. See Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to
Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 571 n.82 (1993)
(finding, based on figures from 1990, that in an Arizona family court 88.2% of
divorce cases had one pro se litigant and 52% had both parties proceeding pro
se).
23. Telephone Interview with Stacey Marz, Dir., Family Law Self-Help Ctr.
(May 14, 2013).
24. Id. Mark Andrews’s contribution to this issue of the Alaska Law Review
cites substantially similar data, relying upon Katherine Alteneder, Literacy and
the
Courts,
24
ALASKA
JUST.
F.
1
(2007),
available
at
justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/24/2summer2007/242.summer2007.pdf. See Mark
Andrews, Duties of the Judicial System to Pro Se Litigants, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 189,
189–90 (2013). The fact that the available data from the Family Law Self-Help
Center has remained steady since at least 2007 suggests that the number of pro
se litigants is perhaps no longer increasing.
25. See Alteneder, supra note 24, at 1 (noting, without citing data, an increase
in the number of self represented litigants in Alaska); Lois Bloom & Helen
Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 479 (2002) (explaining that filings in federal
courts have increased dramatically and that a significant percentage of those
filings involve pro se litigants). See also Ronald W. Staudt & Paula L. Hannaford,
Access to Justice for the Self-Represented Litigant: An Interdisciplinary Investigation by
Designers and Lawyers, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1017, 1018 (2002) (commenting that
filings by pro se litigants have increased in the past decade); Madelynn Herman,
Pro Se Statistics, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS. (Sept.
25,
2006),
http://web.archive.org/web/20120504035215/http://www.ncsconline.org/wc
/publications/memos/prosestatsmemo.htm (providing more recent, but
scattered, data).
26. See John C. Rothermich, Ethical and Procedural Implications of
“Ghostwriting” for Pro Se Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2687, 2689 (1999) (describing unbundled legal services as a
suggested solution to the problem of unmet legal needs).
27. See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN
AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW INCOME AMERICANS
(2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/docume
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essentially a function of this gap. They view pro se litigants as reluctant
participants in the legal system, going it alone because they cannot
afford to pursue a legal solution to their problems in any other way.28
But going it alone, they rarely succeed.29 As a response, many
commentators argue that the American commitment to equal justice
under the law demands that the legal profession develop new,
unbundled ways of meeting low-income citizens’ needs at lower costs.30
The reaction of state bars to the rise in self-represented litigation is
also driven by economic considerations. Increased pro se litigation
changes the legal marketplace, especially for attorneys providing legal
services to individuals of modest means.31 On this view, more selfrepresentation means fewer clients.32 For these attorneys, the issue is not
necessarily about “access to justice” or other ideals, but may instead be
about their ability to unbundle their services so as to maintain their
position in a changing marketplace.33

nting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (attempting to document the
representation gap).
28. Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme
Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537,
1542 (2005). This view is undoubtedly true in many cases, but not in all. See id. at
1573–76 (providing an overview of the many other reasons why many litigants
proceed pro se).
29. See Michelle N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The
Efficacy of Using Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving
Litigation, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 166, 211–12 (2012)
(describing the procedural difficulties of pro se litigation). There are no clear
statistics on the rate of failure for pro se litigants as compared to represented
litigants with similar claims. Litigants, of course, fail for all sorts of reasons.
Nevertheless, it is widely believed that pro se litigants are less successful than
represented ones. Judges used to speak about this frankly in terms of a selfrepresented litigant’s right “to commit judicial suicide.” Burks v. State, 748 P.2d
1178, 1183 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (Coats, J., dissenting). For reasons discussed
below, this rhetoric is now out of favor, however accurate it might be in relation
to actual consequences.
30. See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 453–54 (“The provision of ‘unbundled’
legal aid has been this decade’s response to the severe shortage of lawyers
available to represent poor litigants.”); see also Brenda Star Adams, Note,
“Unbundled Legal Services”: A Solution to the Problems Caused by Pro Se Litigation in
Massachusetts’s Civil Courts, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 345–46, 348 (2005)
(encouraging limited representation in Massachusetts to protect indigent
litigants from having to pay more than they can afford and noting the author’s
belief that “our system [is] one that provides justice for all its litigants, regardless
of financial status”).
31. See Adams, supra note 30, at 313–14 (describing pro se litigation’s impact
on attorney demand).
32. Id. at 304. However, there are currently no significant studies indicating
whether the increase in self-representation has actually appreciably reduced the
number of clients served by such lawyers.
33. This was arguably less important in 1993, the year of Alaska Op. 93-1.
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Against this background, the Alaska Bar Ethics Committee justified
attorney ghostwriting primarily as a way of making legal services
available to individuals in “poor financial conditions” who might not
otherwise have effective access to the courts.34 The Ethics Committee
recognized that ghostwriting could easily become a way for lawyers to
provide unethical or incompetent services from behind the “veil [of]
anonymity.”35 Therefore, in Alaska Op. 93-1, the Ethics Committee
exhorts lawyers who might provide these services to abide by all ethical
rules and professional canons. The Opinion asserts that a lawyer
providing limited or undisclosed services still must provide her client
with high-quality work.36 Her agreement to provide such services
creates a lawyer-client relationship like any other, with all of its
attendant duties.37 For example, if the attorney assists the pro se litigant
in the preparation of documents that the attorney could not ethically
sign, then the attorney has violated her obligation not to act unethically
through the act of another.38
Alaska Op. 93-1 gestures at many of the relevant issues of
professional responsibility surrounding ghostwriting, but does not
address some of the most difficult questions, like whether there is a limit
to the extent attorneys may assist a client before they are required to
disclose their participation. Consequently, the Opinion’s brief and
generalized treatment of the issue has been subject to several
misinterpretations. For instance, Alaska Op. 93-1 apparently suggests
that attorney ghostwriting is properly limited to filings other than
pleadings and motions. This is the interpretation of the American Bar
Association’s (“ABA”) Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, which has interpreted attorney ghostwriting in Alaska as
requiring disclosure unless the “lawyer merely helped fill out forms

Today, an increasing number of individuals use private document preparation
services rather than hiring an attorney. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE
DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., AN ANALYSIS OF RULES THAT ENABLE LAWYERS TO SERVE
PRO SE LITIGANTS: A WHITE PAPER 5, 11 (2009) (noting the need for the
professional rules to enable a “lawyer to limit his or her services and to compete
with those who provide only legal information,” such as a legal self-help
website).
34. Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1. Alaska has also established a lawyer’s
role in promoting “access to the legal system.” ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
pmbl.
35. Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1 n.1.
36. Id. at 1; see also ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2, cmt. 7 (“[A]n
agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty
to provide competent representation.”).
37. Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1.
38. Id. at 1 n.1. The relevant rule is now ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
8.4(a).
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designed for pro se litigants.”39 The Advisory Committee on
Professional Ethics for the Supreme Court of New Jersey embraced a
similar interpretation by lumping Alaska Op. 93-1 in with state bar
opinions that require disclosure only when a “requisite quantum of aid”
has been given to the pro se litigant.40
What these interpretations identify as a rather restrictive ethics
opinion prohibiting undisclosed attorney assistance with pleadings is,
upon a closer reading, a very expansive allowance for the undisclosed
assistance of counsel.41 In an endnote to Alaska Op. 93-1, the Ethics
Committee states its awareness that “attorneys may get involved in
preparing pleadings and filings for clients outside the area of domestic
relations, and for purposes which are not as worthy.”42 Though this
sentence implies that pleadings in some contexts may be less worthy, it
is not intended to suggest that preparing pleadings in an undisclosed
manner is itself unworthy or contrary to the rule. In fact, the text of the
Opinion repeatedly discusses preparing pleadings as one of the tasks
that may be undisclosed and cites as support a Virginia Ethics Opinion
permitting a lawyer to prepare “discovery requests, pleadings or briefs
without entering an appearance.”43 While the authors of Alaska Op. 93-1
clearly believed that the practice of ghostwriting filings should be
limited, they did not provide ethical guidelines for determining the
proper scope of that practice. They simply stated that an attorney who
prepares or assists in the preparation of a pleading signed by a pro se
litigant is “under the same ethical constraints as if [she] were to sign the
pleading with [her] own name.”44
Some of the confusion surrounding the interpretation of Alaska Op.
93-1 is undoubtedly due to the Opinion’s unspoken commitment to the

39. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446, at 1
n.3 (2007) [hereinafter ABA Op. 07-446] (discussing undisclosed legal assistance
to pro se litigants in various jurisdictions).
40. N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 713, at 3–4 (2008).
41. See Jona Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1145, 1166 n.120 (2001) (correctly identifying the expansive allowance for
undisclosed assistance in Alaska Op. 93-1).
42. Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1 n.1.
43. Id. at 2; see Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1127 (1988), available at
http://www.vacle.org/opinions/1127.htm. Note that Alaska Op. 93-1
erroneously cites to Va. Op. 1129.
44. Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1 n.1. This is a perplexingly broad
suggestion, especially given that an attorney’s signature is often presumed to be
ethically required, including under FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See Richard G. Johnson,
Symposium: Happy (?) Birthday Rule 11: Integrating Legal Ethics & Professional
Responsibility with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 819, 862–
64 (2004) (quoting Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271–73 (10th Cir. 2010))
(noting the interplay between ghostwriting, the duty of candor, and Rule 11).
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ethical legitimacy of unbundled legal services. Alaska Op. 93-1 directly
defends the ability of a family law attorney to help a pro se client
prepare a motion for child support modification without entering an
appearance in the litigation (and thus, one assumes, without doing more
for the client). The Opinion is written generally as a defense of
undisclosed services, but is focused throughout on the goal of
permitting attorneys to provide more services to low-income clients. In a
sense, the real concern driving Alaska Op. 93-1 is permitting attorneys to
serve clients according to the clients’ financial means without
undermining the quality of those services or making them unaffordable.
What Alaska Op. 93-1 never makes clear is why allowing an attorney,
for example, to write a pro se client’s child support modification motion
should entail allowing that attorney’s assistance to be undisclosed.45
The idea of unbundled legal services has often been criticized as a
threat to the ethical demands of competency and zealousness in
representation, as well as to the attorney’s duty to avoid frivolous
claims.46 In its most persuasive form, the argument against unbundled
services is twofold. First, the professional rules are grounded in a form
of relationship (full-service representation) that encourages and
incentivizes compliance with those rules. And second, limiting the
“attorney-client relationship” by unbundling legal services deprives
many of the professional rules of this grounding. A lawyer who
provides unbundled services completes a limited task, based on limited
contact with the client, for a limited fee. In this situation, the limited fee
provides the attorney with little material incentive to spend the requisite
amount of time and effort to comply with ARPC 1.1 (demanding
competent legal services) and ARPC 3.1 (prohibiting frivolous claims).
Some critics have also highlighted the lack of continuity in
attorney-client relationships based on unbundled services.47 This lack of
continuity potentially deprives the attorney-client relationship of the
ongoing interaction that fosters loyalty and the attendant zeal in
advocacy. ARPC 1.16, which sets limitations on how and under what
45. Steve Van Goor, current ethics counsel to the Alaska Bar Association,
has acknowledged that, to his recollection, little attention was paid in the debate
over Alaska Op. 93-1 to exactly why non-disclosure was important to the
broader justification of increasing access to justice. Telephone Interview with
Steve Van Goor, Bar Counsel, Alaska Bar Ass’n (Feb. 7, 2013).
46. See Richard Zorza, Re-Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Legal Ethics
and Technological Innovation in Legal Practice: From Threat to Opportunity, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2665 (1999) (noting critics’ concerns about competency
and zeal).
47. See id. at 2667 (“Traditional ethical rules place—or at least appear to
place—a high value on continuity of representation . . . . Critics claim that partial
service models implicitly or explicitly violate those rules.”).
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conditions an attorney may withdraw from representation, inscribes a
desire for continuity in the attorney-client relationship, especially over
the course of a single litigation.48 The explicit concern of ARPC 1.16 is to
prevent an attorney from leaving a client in the lurch in a manner
detrimental to his or her interests. However, the concern with continuity
also encourages an attorney to provide competent services by fostering a
personal relationship that can deepen the lawyer’s commitment to the
client’s cause.49
Since the revision of ARPC 1.2(c) in 2004, the debate in Alaska over
unbundled services has largely been settled. Proponents of unbundled
services trust that, in concert with the other rules of professional
conduct, ARPC 1.2(c)’s requirement that any contractual limitations on
representation be “reasonable” and subject to the client’s informed
consent will prevent abuses. These proponents, even outside of Alaska,
believe that the potential gains promised by unbundled services in
meeting the unmet legal needs of low-income citizens outweigh the
costs of potential abuses by attorneys who offer such services in an
incompetent or irresponsible manner.50 To date, the Alaska courts and
the Alaska Bar Association have never sanctioned an attorney for
abusing the terms of unbundled services. But this fact does not suggest
that such abuses have not occurred, nor that they will not occur in the
future when such services likely become more common.51 Given that the

48. See id. (noting limitations on an attorney’s freedom to withdraw from
representation).
49. See id. (explaining how partial focus can lead to less competent work and
explaining that concerns about continuity derive in part from concerns about
competence).
50. See Rothermich, supra note 26, at 2720, 2728 (noting how “abuses . . .
might arise when attorneys offer ghostwriting assistance without at least some
investigation of their pro se clients’ allegations,” but concluding that “[c]ourts
and bar associations should make every effort to avoid stifling the development
of these new models of legal practice” because “such models are providing more
legal assistance to more people, incrementally increasing access to civil justice”).
51. See Letter from Sheldon Schwartz, County Court Judge, Dade County,
Florida, to Elizabeth Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, Florida Bar (March 1, 1999) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Schwartz Letter] (“At one time, the practice of law was
a [truly] honorable profession and unfortunately recently it has become more of
a business enterprise.”). Judge Schwartz does not elaborate on his meaning in
this letter. It is reasonable to infer, however, that he does not regard publicspirited lawyers who conscientiously assist low-income clients as the culprits of
abuses of ghostwritten assistance. The problems of ghostwritten assistance, he
seems to suggest, become clear when enterprising lawyers take the money of
low-income citizens to provide low-quality work that does not actually benefit
the client because the client cannot understand it nor successfully use it in court.
The opinions of Florida county court judges on this issue will be discussed in
greater detail below.
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Alaska courts apply a quite forgiving standard to pro se filings,52 they
are unlikely to notice a pro se filing that is ghostwritten in an
incompetent manner by an attorney. They would likely simply assume
that it is another incompetent effort by a pro se litigant. In such a
situation, the Alaska Bar would still have an interest in protecting the
integrity of the profession against an attorney who took money from a
client to produce a product that is potentially indistinguishable from
what a smart pro se litigant could produce himself. Given the potential
for abuse within the limits currently set by Rule 1.2(c), the question
becomes whether the ethical license to ghostwrite for pro se clients adds
something of clear value to the enterprise of expanding legal services
that is worth the potential cost.

II. ALASKA OP. 93-1 AND THE NATIONAL DEBATE OVER
GHOSTWRITING
In beginning to think about how Alaska Op. 93-1 might be revised
in order to address misunderstandings and unanswered questions, it is
useful to consider the Opinion in relation to both the federal case law
and the ethics opinions of other states. To a great extent, the courts and
state bar associations have been at an impasse on the acceptability of
attorney ghostwriting. The federal courts have largely condemned the
practice, while many state bar associations—and, recently, the American
Bar Association itself—have embraced it. At the federal level, the list of
condemnatory cases is impressive.53 In one of the most frequently cited

52. See Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987) (stating that pleadings
of pro se litigants should be held to a lower standard than pleadings done by
lawyers).
53. See Robbins, supra note 12, at 285 (noting that federal courts have almost
universally condemned ghostwriting); see, e.g., Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268,
1272–73 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that ghostwriting constitutes a
“misrepresentation to this court”); Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir.
1971) (“If a brief is prepared in any substantial part by a member of the bar, it
must be signed by him.”); Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Emps. of
Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *14–16 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007)
(holding that undisclosed ghostwriting violates several ethics rules and the spirit
of FED. R. CIV. P. 11); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D.
Kan. 1997) (requiring pro se defendant to disclose whether she was represented
by an attorney); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp.
1075, 1077 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“[T]he Court considers it improper for lawyers to
draft or assist in drafting complaints or other documents submitted to the Court
on behalf of litigants designated as pro se.”); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966
F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“Important policy considerations militate
against validating an arrangement wherein a party appears pro se while in
reality the party is receiving legal assistance from a licensed attorney.”); Johnson
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Colo. 1994), aff’d in part,
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cases, Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners for County of Fremont,54 the
court condemned ghostwriting as a violation of both Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the applicable standards of
professional ethics.55 Quoting one of the earliest cases to address the
subject, the district court stated:
What we fear is that in some cases actual members of the bar
represent petitioners, informally or otherwise, and prepare
briefs for them which the assisting lawyers do not sign,
and
thus escape the obligation imposed on members of the bar,
typified by F.R.Civ.P. 11, but which exists in all cases, criminal
as well as civil, of representing to the court that there is good
ground to support the assertions made. We cannot approve of
such a practice. If a brief is prepared in any substantial part by
a member of the bar, it must be signed by him. We reserve the
right, where a brief gives occasion to believe that the petitioner
has had legal assistance, to require such signature, if such,
indeed, is the fact.56
The court in Johnson also argued that ghostwriting is a form of
misrepresentation to the court, claiming that it violates what is now
Model Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.57
Beyond the specific concern with Rule 11, many of the federal
courts have expressed concern that when an attorney ghostwrites a pro
se litigant’s filings the attorney allows the litigant to take unfair
advantage of the court’s leniency toward pro se litigants or otherwise
disapproved in part, 85 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Having a litigant appear to be
pro se when in truth an attorney is authoring pleadings and necessarily guiding
the course of the litigation with an unseen hand is ingenuous [sic] to say the
least; it is far below the level of candor which must be met by members of the
bar.”); In re Brown, 354 B.R. 535, 545 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (footnote omitted)
(“[I]f an attorney writes a pleading, he or she has a duty to make sure that the
Court knows he or she wrote it. The Court is not required to play a game of
‘catch-me-if-you-can’ with a ghostwriter. All counsel owe a duty of candor to
every court in which they appear. Inherent in that duty is the requirement that
counsel disclose his or her involvement in the case.”); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762,
767 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (“[T]he Court recognizes the act of ghost-writing as a
violation of Local Rule 9010-1(d) and in contravention of the policies and
procedures set forth in the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Ostrovsky v. Monroe (In re Ellingson), 230
B.R. 426, 435 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999) (holding that court rules, particularly
FED. R. CIV. P. 11, as well as the then-current ABA Standing Comm. Op. 1414,
prohibiting ghostwriting).
54. 868 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994).
55. Id. at 1231.
56. Id. at 1231–32 (quoting Ellis, 448 F.2d at 1328).
57. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1232.
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causes undue confusion or inefficiency.58 In Johnson, the court discussed
an attorney’s ghostwritten assistance as an “unseen hand” guiding the
course of litigation to the detriment of the opposing party.59 Few courts,
however, would read this negative “unseen hand” metaphor to include
very limited forms of assistance, such as advising a friend about how he
might proceed with a given legal matter. In Ricotta v. California,60 the
court attempted to draw the line between innocuous forms of limited
assistance and forms of assistance that have a detrimental impact on
judicial proceedings. The court stated:
Attorneys cross the line . . . when they gather and anonymously
present legal arguments, with the actual and constructive
knowledge that the work will be presented in some
similar
form in a motion before the Court. With such participation the
attorney guides the course of litigation while standing in the
shadows of the Courthouse door.61
In addition, some courts believe that attorneys who work behind
the “cloak of anonymity” evade the effective enforcement of the rules of
professional conduct, thus depriving their clients of one important
avenue of redress in the event of attorney negligence or misconduct.62
Twenty-four states have addressed the issue of whether to permit
attorney ghostwriting.63 According to the Supreme Court of New Jersey
Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, these state opinions can be
grouped into roughly three categories.64 The first group finds that
attorneys have no duty to disclose assistance to a pro se client as long as
they provide that assistance ethically and competently and violate no
court rules.65 Alaska Op. 93-1, which was among the first state bar ethics

58. See, e.g., Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1077–78 (stating that
ghostwriting unfairly allows pro se parties to benefit from legal help and be held
to a less stringent standard simultaneously).
59. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1232.
60. 4 F. Supp. 2d. 961 (S.D. Cal 1998).
61. Id. at 987.
62. In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 768 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003).
63. Robbins, supra note 12, at 286 n.80 (citing Maryland Legal Assistance
Network, Informal National Survey of Ethical Opinions Related to “Discrete Task
Lawyering” (2003), http://www.unbundledlaw.org/thinking/ethicsurvey.htm).
64. New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. 713, at 2–3 (2008).
65. See id. at 3 (stating that some ethics opinions find no duty to disclose
limited representation). See also N.M. R. of Prof’l Conduct R. 16-303 cmt. 15
(2008); Cal. R. Ct. 3.37(a) (2007); Minn. State Bar Ass’n Pro Se Implementation
Comm., Final Report (2006); N.C. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op.
2005-10 (2006); Ariz. State Bar Ethics Op. on Rule 05-06 (2005); D.C. Bar Ass’n
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 330 (2005); Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1; Me. State Bar
Ass’n, Ethics Op. 89 (1988); Utah State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 74 (1981).
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opinions to address this issue,66 falls into this first group.67 The second
group prohibits the practice outright.68 The third group imposes a
limited duty of disclosure, sometimes by using an “imprecise”
demarcation based on the “requisite quantum of aid.”69
Recently, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 07-446 (“ABA Op. 07-446”) which
supersedes its earlier guidance on the issue and attempts to lead state
bar organizations toward a more open embrace of ghostwriting. ABA
Op. 07-446 makes the obligation to disclose contingent on whether “the
fact of assistance is material to the matter” involved in the litigation.70 In
most instances, of course, this would not be the case. The fact that an
attorney provides ghostwritten assistance will rarely be material to a
client’s substantive legal dispute. Thus, the ABA opinion suggests that
in almost all cases there is no duty to disclose.71
In a recent case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals discussed
ABA Op. 07-446 in the context of a case about whether to censure an
attorney for ghostwriting.72 The Second Circuit did not directly express
an opinion on whether the practice violated an attorney’s professional
obligations or court rules, but simply noted the split among the state
bars and court opinions.73 In the light of this widespread disagreement,
the court decided that, at the very least, it is reasonable to believe that
the attorney in question did not know that what she was doing was
wrong or that disclosure was required.74 Accordingly, the court did not
impose public censure for this conduct.75 Nevertheless, the court noted
that the ABA’s new support for attorney ghostwriting likely indicated

66. Preceding it were ABA Informal Op. 1414 (1978); Utah State Bar Ethics
Comm., Op. 74 (1981); Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial
Ethics, Op. 1987-2 (1987); Me. Bar Op. No. 89 (1988); Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1127
(1988); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. 613 (1990).
67. New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. 713, at 3–4.
68. Robbins, supra note 12, at 287 n.83 (identifying ten states that expressly
prohibit the practice).
69. Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 98-5 (1998); Del. State Bar
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1994-2 (1994); Fla. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (2000); Ky. Bar Ass’n Op. E-343 (1991); Mass. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 98-1 (1998); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm.,
Unbundled Services—Assisting the Pro se Litigant (1999); Utah State Bar Ethics
Comm., Op. 74 (1981).
70. ABA Op. 07-446, supra note 39.
71. See id. (stating that the fact that a litigant who submitted papers on a pro
se basis had received legal assistance is not material to the litigation’s merits).
72. See In re Liu, 664 F.3d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing ABA Op. 07446).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 372–73.
75. Id. at 373.
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the future direction of the debate.76 “Because most states look to the
ABA Model Rules when adopting and amending their own rules of
professional conduct, the coming years may see a number of courts and
states take a more relaxed stance on ghostwriting.”77
While the Second Circuit opinion suggests a possible
rapprochement between the courts and state bars over the issue of
ghostwriting, a recent ethics opinion by the Florida State Bar Association
suggests a different course for the future.78 In 1999, the Florida Bar
Association Committee on Professional Ethics sent inquiries to county
court judges in the State regarding an earlier bar ethics opinion
defending ghostwriting.79 The earlier opinion stated that “[i]t is not
uncommon for a lawyer to offer limited services in assisting a party in
the drafting of papers while stopping short of representing the party as
attorney of record. Under these circumstances, there is no ethical
impropriety if the attorney fails to sign the pleadings.”80 Almost
unanimously, the county court judges responded that the permissive
stance toward “ghosted pleadings” should be reversed.81 In response,
the Florida Bar issued a Reconsideration of Florida Opinion 79-7,
requiring that “[a]ny pleadings or other papers prepared by an attorney
for a pro se litigant and filed with the court must indicate ‘Prepared with
the Assistance of Counsel.’”82
The Florida county court judges offered various reasons why they
believed the practice of ghostwriting should end or at least be modified
to include some form of disclosure. Several of them believed that the
practice simply did not help pro se litigants.83 These judges reported that
the pro se litigants who receive this limited assistance of counsel come
before the court with (poorly-drafted) documents they do not
understand and cannot adequately explain.84 This, of course, is a

76. Id. at 371.
77. Robbins, supra note 12, at 290.
78. See Florida Op. 79-7, supra note 13 (requiring all documents prepared
with assistance of counsel and filed with the court to clearly reflect the
participation of an attorney).
79. Id.
80. Id. (excerpting the original Florida Op. 79-7).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Letter of Charles G. Cofer, County Court Judge, Duval County,
Florida, to Elizabeth Tarbert, Florida Bar Ethics Counsel (March 9, 1999)
[hereinafter Cofer Letter] (on file with author); Letter of Michael Samuels,
County Court Judge, Dade County, Florida, to Elizabeth Tarbert, Florida Bar
Ethics Counsel (March 3, 1999) [hereinafter Samuels Letter] (on file with author).
84. See Samuels Letter, supra note 82; Schwartz Letter, supra note 51
(complaining of pro se litigants who “come before the court [and] are not
properly prepared and have not been properly counseled and often have filed
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criticism of unbundled legal services in general, not only of undisclosed
assistance. From the perspective of one county judge, however, the
problem with ghostwriting is that it undermines the court’s ability “to
monitor any abuses of the privilege which members of the bar have to
assist pro se litigants.”85 Although this judge reported that the
unbundled assistance of attorneys often results “in individuals coming
before [him] who have either misconstrued the advice given to them, or
who have insufficient understanding of the advice to apply it
appropriately in a courtroom setting,” he did not reject such assistance
outright.86 Instead, he suggested that attorneys who help prepare the
filings of pro se litigants should disclose that they have done so by
appending a short statement to that effect and including the attorney’s
state bar number.87 This disclosure would simultaneously enable the
court to monitor for apparent abuses and discourage such abuses by the
sheer fact that such monitoring is possible.
Due in part to responses of the county judges, the Florida Bar
Association decided that the theoretical benefits of attorney
ghostwriting were outweighed by its costs.88 Florida Opinion 79-7
(Reconsideration) is the only state bar opinion to reverse an earlier
opinion based on the opinions of judicial actors. To some extent, judges
who reject ghostwriting may be expressing their rather austere view of
professional ethics without adequate concern for how the legal needs of
low-income persons are going to be met.89 However, for many judges,
“the effect of ghost-writing on the operation of [the c]ourt cannot be
overemphasized.”90 From this perspective, the problem with
ghostwriting is that it fails to do the very thing that proponents of the
practice use to justify it: give pro se litigants more effective access to
justice.

III. ALASKA OP. 93-1 AND PRO SE ACCOMMODATION IN THE
ALASKA COURTS
The story of Florida Op. 79-7 is instructive for thinking about how
the Alaska Bar Association could revisit many of the arguments of

improper or inaccurate pleadings”)
85. See Cofer Letter, supra note 82.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Florida Op. 79-7, supra note 13.
89. See In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (emphasizing that
ghostwriting is an act of “misrepresentation that violates an attorney’s duty and
professional responsibility to provide the utmost candor toward the Court”).
90. Id. at 770.
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Alaska Op. 93-1. Pro se litigants who pay an attorney for an unbundled
service must ultimately come before a judge and argue their cases. Some
critics of ghostwriting worry that pro se litigants who have benefitted
from the assistance of an attorney will have an unfair advantage in
relation to the opposing (represented) party because the pro se litigant
will receive both judicial leniency and professional help. It is possible,
however, that the situation could be quite the opposite. If a pro se
litigant presents ghostwritten documents, it could just as easily lead a
judge to withdraw prematurely the kinds of special consideration that
pro se litigants might require. Ghostwriting might confuse a judge’s
already quite complicated task of discerning how to balance a pro se
litigant’s needs with the judge’s obligation to remain impartial.91
Alaska Op. 93-1 was conceived at a time when the Alaska courts
were in the midst of their own effort to define how they would address
the particular needs of pro se litigants while preserving the impartiality
of the judicial forum. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Haines
v. Kerner,92 which established a generous pleading standard for pro se
litigants, the Alaska Supreme Court issued several opinions in the 1980s
that continue to shape how Alaska judges manage these litigants.93 In
Breck v. Ulmer,94 the Alaska Supreme Court followed Haines by declaring
that judges must hold “the pleadings of pro se litigants . . . to less
stringent standards than those of lawyers.”95 Breck established a
framework in which pro se litigants would not only receive special
consideration and guidance at the pleading stage, but also on procedural
matters that arise over the course of litigation. The Breck court also
determined that judges have a special obligation to inform pro se
litigants “of the proper procedure for the action he or she is obviously
attempting to accomplish.”96
The Alaska Supreme Court was aware that such a regime of judicial
91. With pro se litigants, as with under-performing lawyers, the judge must
sometimes simply watch as the unskilled party goes down in flames regardless
of the potential, but unsuccessfully articulated, merits of his case. See Burks v.
State, 748 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (Coats, J., dissenting)
(commenting on the pro se party’s right “to represent himself regardless of how
bad an idea that might be for him”).
92. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
93. Id. at 520 (stating that the court will hold the pleadings of pro se litigants
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). See also
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (“Even in the formal
litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than
other parties.”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“The handwritten pro
se document is to be liberally construed.”).
94. 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987).
95. Id. at 75.
96. Id.
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generosity would potentially threaten a judge’s fundamental obligation
to provide an impartial forum for the consideration of all litigants’
claims. Therefore, in Bauman v. State, Division of Family & Youth
Services,97 the court limited the holding in Breck by declaring that “to
instruct a pro se litigant as to each step in litigating a claim would
compromise the court’s impartiality in deciding the case by forcing the
judge to act as an advocate for one side.”98 Bauman required a litigant to
make a genuine effort to learn and comply with procedural
requirements before the court would extend leniency.99 Yet the court
also provided the judge significant discretion on how much guidance to
offer a pro se litigant.100
Alaska Op. 93-1 makes no direct mention of the struggle of Alaska
courts to deal with the rise of pro se litigants. However, implicit in most
defenses of attorney ghostwriting is the claim that such undisclosed
assistance will actually help those clients in the courts.101 As one
proponent of ghostwriting puts the issue, “[p]ermitting ghostwriting so
that complaints are adequately crafted levels the playing field. It also
streamlines the litigation process by clarifying the issues and reducing
the number of dispositive motions and responses.”102 Alaska Op. 93-1
expresses confidence that ghostwriting will not foster unfairness, but is
otherwise silent on how the practice will affect the administration of
justice.
As noted above, the major defense of attorney ghostwriting is that,
despite relatively widespread condemnation by judges, the practice will
do no harm and will positively benefit pro se plaintiffs and courts.
Proponents offer little evidence of these proposed benefits and usually
rest their case on general claims: for example, that ghostwriting will
“streamlin[e] the litigation process by clarifying the issues and reducing
the number of dispositive motions and responses.”103 There is
preliminary evidence, however, that unbundled legal services provide
little benefit to low-income clients.104 For this reason, proponents of the

97. 768 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1989).
98. Id. at 1099.
99. Id.
100. See Shooshanian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618, 622 (Alaska 2010) (“We review for
abuse of discretion . . . decisions about guidance to a pro se litigant.”).
101. Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1158.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 490–95. Steinberg understandably goes to
great lengths to emphasize the limitations of her study, and minimize its
ultimate significance, but nonetheless concludes by encouraging an increase in
full-service representation (or at least new experiments in unbundled services).
Id. at 496–97, 500.
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practice tend to focus their arguments on the idea that the harms of
ghostwriting are unfounded.
Alaska Op. 93-1 adopts a view shared by many proponents, which
is that ghostwritten filings will be obvious to the judge, who may then
adjust his treatment of the pro se litigant accordingly.105 In a recent
opinion, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility wholeheartedly endorsed this view by incorporating a
lengthy passage from an article by one of ghostwriting’s principal
proponents.106 The passage is worth quoting at length, both because it is
crucial to the ABA’s argument and because it expresses the view
adopted in part by Alaska Op. 93-1:107
Practically speaking . . . ghostwriting is obvious from the face
of the legal papers filed, a fact that prompts objections to
ghostwriting in the first place. . . . Thus, where the court sees
the higher quality of the pleadings, there is no reason to apply
any liberality in construction because liberality is, by definition,
only necessary where pleadings are obscure. If the pleading can
be clearly understood, but an essential fact or element is
missing, neither an attorney-drafted nor a pro se-drafted
complaint should survive the motions. A court that refuses to
dismiss or enter summary judgment against a nonghostwritten pro se pleading that lacks essential facts or
elements commits reversible error in the same manner as if it
refuses to deny such dispositive motions against an attorneydrafted complaint.108
The ABA’s argument is premised on two crucial assumptions. First,
it assumes that ghostwriting is always (or at least usually) obvious
“from the face of the legal papers.”109 Second, it assumes that a judge
will competently manage a case regardless of whether or not she
perceives a ghostwritten product.
That ghostwriting is facially obvious is undoubtedly true in most

105. See Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157 (suggesting that ghostwriting
will be obvious in the higher quality of pleadings, so the court will not have a
reason to construe such pleadings liberally).
106. ABA Op. 07-446, supra note 39, at 3.
107. See Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at n.2 (The opinion notes “that judges
are usually able to discern when a pro se litigant has received the assistance of
counsel in preparing or drafting pleadings. In that event, the Committee believes
that any preferential treatment otherwise afforded the litigant will likely be
tempered, if not overlooked.”). Indeed, Goldschmidt cites part of this footnote in
support of his view. Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157 n.68.
108. Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157–58 (citation omitted).
109. ABA Op. 07-446, supra note 39, at 3.
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cases, especially where the pro se litigant is marginally literate110 or has
not availed himself of any technical legal assistance whatsoever.
However, an alternative and increasingly likely case is not hard to
imagine. If the number of reasonably well-educated pro se litigants who
are motivated by beliefs and desires other than the hard necessities of
poverty111 continues to rise, and they are resourced by increasingly wellfunded legal self-help centers and do-it-yourself websites, then these
litigants might reasonably produce filings that have the look and feel of
a “lawyerly” product.
This possible alternative becomes even more plausible when one
considers the relative quality (or lack thereof) of many attorneyproduced pleadings. Even a modest amount of experience with the sorts
of pleadings often filed with the courts teaches that attorneys often
produce pleadings that are confused and confusing.112 Whether due to
rushed circumstances or marginal competence, many attorneys produce
documents that “on their face” could be mistaken for the products of
intelligent non-lawyers who have acquired some rudimentary facility
with legal language, probably through the imitation of statements found
in similar documents.113 Against this background, it is not hard to
imagine a pro se litigant who is able to feign legal knowledge sufficient
to produce a passable brief.114 The significance of this possibility is that it
110. See Alteneder, supra note 24, at 5–8 (discussing the challenge of marginal
literacy for Alaska courts).
111. See Swank, supra note 28, at 1574 (noting various reasons for the growth
of pro se litigation, including increased literacy rates and education, mistrust of
the legal system, a desire to avoid legal fees, do-it-yourself-ism, and a belief that
many forms of litigation have been sufficiently simplified) (citations omitted).
112. What Judge Learned Hand had to say about this matter in 1921 is
doubtlessly true today:
I dare say that an ingenious actuary might find upon irrefragable
computation that in general loss of time, misprision of judges,
consequent appeals, discouragement of suitors and the like, the annual
loss to our country through bad pleadings equaled the cost of four new
battleships, or complete refashioning of primary education.
GERARD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 123 (2010).
113. A long history of “jailhouse” lawyering has taught that non-lawyers,
given time, determination, and some resources, can produce what look like the
products of low-level (or even not-so-low-level) lawyers. See Ellis v. Maine, 448
F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971) (recognizing that sometimes pro se litigants who
claim complete ignorance of the law present briefs written by someone with
legal knowledge but not certified by the bar).
114. See id. (“In a growing number of petitions . . . the Petitioner . . . presents
a brief which, however insufficient, was manifestly written by someone with
some legal knowledge.”). Here, contrary to Goldschmidt’s use of this case, the
“someone with some legal knowledge” could easily be a smart pro se litigant
who took advantage of the resources in his local court’s litigation self-help
center. But see Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157 n.68 (using the same quote to
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makes a competent pro se pleading seem to the judge like it is based on
genuine legal understanding when it is not. This misapprehension
would then threaten to obfuscate the very basis of the judge’s generous
treatment of pro se litigants: a recognition of the “categorical disparity
between the [unrepresented and represented] parties’ abilities to obtain
a just resolution to their dispute.”115 If the judge determines that she is
dealing with a legally sophisticated pro se litigant, then she is
potentially going to afford that litigant less leeway later in the litigation
process, especially in dispositive motions and responses or in the
associated hearings.
This leads to the second major assumption: that a judge’s
perception of a ghostwritten product will have no adverse effects on the
judge’s management of the case. Proponents argue that competent, or
mostly competent, pleadings will require no special leniency whether
they are produced by a pro se litigant or an attorney.116 Professor Jona
Goldschmidt, of Loyola University Chicago, defends this argument by
interpreting the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants announced
in Haines v. Kerner117 as essentially no different than the standard
previously announced for represented litigants in Conley v. Gibson.118 On
this view, despite the plain language in the Haines decision that the
Court holds the pleadings of pro se litigants “to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”119 the difference in practice
between the generosity appropriately extended to inadequate pleadings
by represented or unrepresented parties is negligible.120 Goldschmidt

support the proposition a court can discern a lawyer’s hand in drafting legal
documents).
115. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1985) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (cited in Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics
and Self-Represented Litigants, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 97, 103 n.15
(2007)).
116. See Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157 (discussing the lack of necessity
for leniency where pleadings are of higher quality).
117. 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).
118. See Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1155 (“[A]ll pleadings, pro se or
otherwise, are entitled to the liberal pleading rules of Conley v. Gibson”);
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (holding a complaint may not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief”).
119. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520.
120. Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1155. There is recent evidence that after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), there has
been a substantial increase in the rate of dismissal of pro se complaints. See
Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 615 (2010) (observing a substantially greater
increase in the rate of dismissal of pro se suits than represented suits post-Iqbal).
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argues:
If the pleading can be clearly understood, but an essential fact
or element is missing, neither an attorney-drafted nor a pro sedrafted complaint should survive the motions. A court that
refuses to dismiss or enter summary judgment against a nonghostwritten pro se pleading that lacks essential facts or
elements commits reversible error . . . .121
The implication of this line of argument is that a judge’s duty to
extend special consideration to a pro se litigant essentially ends if that
litigant’s pleadings rise to a certain level of adequacy. An adequately
crafted pleading “levels the playing field” such that a judge may
withdraw her solicitude for the pro se litigant and adopt a more neutral
posture toward the contending litigants.122
This argument is largely persuasive, though it contradicts the plain
language (borrowed from Haines) that courts use to describe their
approach to pro se pleadings.123 The problem, however, is that the
argument is excessively confident about a judge’s ability to withdraw
solicitude at the pleading stage without curtailing the kinds of lenient
treatment that pro se litigants will still deserve under the relevant
standards of judicial conduct. The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion otherwise
critical of ghostwriting, pointed toward this issue when it stated that
“the mere assistance of drafting, especially before a trial court, will not
totally obviate some kind of lenient treatment due a substantially pro se
litigant.”124 The Tenth Circuit did not explain what kind of ongoing

This influence of “plausibility pleading” on pro se complaints strikes at least one
commentator as a great threat to the Haines regime of special consideration for
pro se litigants because it opens the gates for lower court judges to dismiss
prima facie “conclusory” claims without doing the extra work of seeing whether
they nonetheless put a legal matter at issue. See Rory K. Schneider, Illiberal
Construction of Pro Se Pleadings, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 623 (2011). Schneider
identifies potential relief from this problem for pro se litigants in Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), where the Court admonished lower
courts for dismissing allegations as conclusory when they were adequate to “put
the[] matters in issue.” Schneider, supra, at 625.
121. Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157.
122. See id. at 1158 (suggesting that ghostwriting puts parties on a level
playing field and streamlines litigation “by clarifying issues and reducing the
number of dispositive motions”).
123. See Schneider, supra note 120, at 586–90 (discussing the travails of the
court’s effort to distinguish between liberal, heightened liberal, and plausibility
pleading standards in relation to different classes of litigants and different kinds
of cases). One lesson to take away is that such distinctions are extremely
complicated to manage in practice.
124. Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing
Rothermich, supra note 26, at 2712).
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lenient treatment would be at issue or how the perception of assistance
in drafting would affect it. Perhaps the most important area where pro
se litigants will require special treatment is in dispositive motions or
hearings after the pleading stage or in preparation for an appeal. It is in
these later stages that misperceptions of a pro se litigant’s sophistication
fostered by attorney ghostwriting may cause potential pitfalls for pro se
litigants and the judges who must manage them.
Under Alaska law, a judge’s struggle to serve appropriately a pro
se litigant only begins with the pleadings. Alaska judges hold “the
pleadings of pro se litigants . . . to less stringent standards than those of
lawyers” but also inform those litigants “of the proper procedure for the
action he or she is obviously attempting to accomplish.”125 However, as
the judge moves from construing pleadings to providing procedural
guidance, she labors under the danger identified by the Alaska Supreme
Court in Bauman: “to instruct a pro se litigant as to each step in litigating
a claim would compromise the court’s impartiality in deciding the case
by forcing the judge to act as an advocate for one side.”126 The judge
thus shares the predicament of Goldilocks: how to find the amount of
solicitude for a pro se litigant that is neither too much, nor too little, but
just right. In each case involving a pro se litigant, the judge must
consider carefully what the pro se party is attempting to accomplish,
why the litigant is failing, and where he is confused or missing the
point. The judge must then intervene appropriately (neither too much
nor too little). The scope of a judge’s duty to provide guidance is a
matter of discretion—it changes with every pro se litigant. In each case,
a judge must consider the pro se litigant’s concrete efforts and actions127
as well as his relative ability to know and understand the rules of the
game he is playing.128 By failing to exercise discretion properly, the
judge may commit an injustice against one or the other litigant in the
case.129

125. Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987).
126. Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099
(Alaska 1989).
127. See, e.g., Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 804 (Alaska 2002) (“Had Kaiser, as
a pro se litigant, made a good faith effort to obtain discovery and informed the
court of his difficulties, he might have been entitled to greater guidance from the
court regarding the mechanics of the discovery process.”).
128. See Noey v. Bledsoe, 978 P.2d 1264, 1269–70 (Alaska 1999) (finding that
the pro se litigant was sufficiently sophisticated to understand the procedural
obligations he was under and take appropriate steps to fulfill them without
additional judicial solicitude).
129. See Burks v. State, 748 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (Coats, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that a litigant who was found incapable of representing
himself at trial, yet was allowed to do so, was an abuse of discretion by the
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The desire to minimize the number of conflicting and confusing
signals in this effort to manage appropriately pro se litigants may
explain why some Florida judges thought that the simple fact of
disclosing attorney assistance would be beneficial in their efforts to
serve these litigants.130 No Alaska case addresses this difficulty directly,
but an examination of several instances of the appellate review of a trial
judge’s discretionary treatment of pro se litigants helps clarify the space
of potential problems. Consider first Collins v. Arctic Builders,131 where
the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that “the superior court must inform a
pro se litigant of the specific defects in his notice of appeal and give him
an opportunity to remedy those defects.”132 In this case, the pro se
plaintiff attempted to appeal a worker’s compensation claim, but failed
to comply with several procedural rules.133 The superior court dismissed
the claim and the supreme court reversed, declaring that the failure of
the lower court to provide procedural allowances was “manifestly
unreasonable and thus constitute[d] an abuse of discretion.”134 The
lower court purportedly dismissed the claim because it believed that to
do otherwise would give the pro se litigant an advantage not afforded to
the represented party.135 In response, the supreme court stated that it
was “not concerned that specificity in pointing out the technical defects
in pro se pleadings will compromise the superior court’s impartiality.”136
The key to the decision in Collins is that a pro se litigant’s efforts to
comply with procedural requirements triggers the mandated forms of
judicial solicitude.137 The pro se litigant’s effort to comply is important
because it indicates good faith,138 while the failure on technicalities
indicates that the reason for failure was an inadequate understanding of

court).
130. See Florida Op. 79-7, supra note 13 (mentioning that judges “believed
that disclosure of professional legal assistance would prove beneficial” in cases
where a lawyer’s help goes beyond merely filling out forms for pro se litigants).
131. 957 P.2d 980 (Alaska 1998) (per curiam).
132. Id. at 982. The court in Collins made this determination under the rule in
Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987), which incorporated the Haines
standard into Alaska law.
133. Collins, 957 P.2d at 981.
134. Id. at 982.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. In Coffland v. Coffland, 4 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2000), the court refused to find
an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s management of a pro se litigant because
the litigant failed “to cooperate with the trial court or to request assistance in
complying with its orders. A pro se litigant must make some attempt to comply
with the court’s procedures before receiving the benefit of the court’s leniency.”
Id. at 321.

RHODES_V10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

256

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/6/2013 12:24 PM

VOL. 30:2

procedural requirements rather than an attempt to game the system. In
more recent opinions, the Alaska Supreme Court has stressed that a pro
se litigant “is expected to make a good faith attempt to comply with
judicial procedures and to acquire general familiarity with and attempt
to comply with the rules of procedure—absent this effort, [the litigant]
may be denied the leniency otherwise afforded pro se litigants.”139
The judge’s special treatment of pro se litigants is not limited to
“pointing out technical defects.” In Worthington v. Worthington,140 the
supreme court determined that the trial court judge in a child custody
modification suit acted within his discretion by providing (or attempting
to provide) substantial assistance to the pro se litigants.141 In
Worthington, the trial judge confronted a pro se litigant who continually
responded to crucial questions with “conclusory statements.”142 When
asked by the litigant what types of evidence the court would like to hear,
the judge explained that he required specifics and some statement of
relevant facts.143 The judge also summarized in clear terms what he
understood the plaintiff to be saying (supposedly, clarifying the
litigant’s confused claims), provided additional time for testimony, and
even asked substantive questions regarding the children’s preferences
and other related matters.144 On review, the supreme court determined
that this kind of assistance—extending well beyond procedural
technicalities—borders on an improper compromise of impartiality, but
remains within the superior court’s appropriate discretion.145
The easy cases under this rule involve litigants who simply do not
make an effort to comply with procedural requirements at all. This was
the case in Bauman, where the court declined “to extend Breck to require
judges to warn pro se litigants on aspects of procedure when the pro se
litigant has failed to at least file a defective pleading.”146 The more
difficult cases involve a sophisticated litigant whose failure to comply
with procedural requirements was actually a combination of footdragging and litigation strategy. In Noey v. Bledsoe,147 for example, the
court held that Noey, a “sophisticated pro se litigant,”148 did not deserve
139. Gilbert v. Nina Plaza Condo Ass’n, 64 P.3d 126, 129 (Alaska 2003) (citing
Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 803 (Alaska 2002)).
140. No. S-13982, 2011 WL 3795532 (Alaska Aug. 24, 2011).
141. Id. at *6.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099
(Alaska 1989).
147. 978 P.2d 1264 (Alaska 1999).
148. Id. at 1269.
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procedural leniency for his petition for a stay on the eve of trial. Taken
in the abstract, Noey’s action seemed paradigmatic of the sort of
procedural mishap that the court should accommodate under Breck. In
this instance, however, the court’s judgment of Noey’s relative
sophistication—exhibited in various ways throughout the litigation
process—was influential in determining that he should be held to an
appropriately strict procedural standard.149
Abstracting from the particular facts of Noey, one can see the
potential for how a judge’s mischaracterization of a pro se litigant’s
sophistication could lead the judge to withdraw leniency when it is truly
deserved. Imagine an “educated and articulate” pro se litigant who
brings a personal injury suit against the other driver, represented by an
attorney, in the wake of a car accident.150 The judge finds the pro se
litigant’s pleadings confusing, but suggestive of a modicum of legal
knowledge. She suspects that the pleadings are “ghostwritten” by an
attorney, but is uncertain based on her experience with intelligent
laypersons who acquire rudimentary knowledge of legal claims and
language, as well as with the relatively low quality of many lawyers’
work. Similarly, at trial, the judge finds that the pro se litigant seems to
understand many procedural requirements—enough so that she again
suspects he was prepped by an attorney prior to trial—but is clearly
confused by others. Mixed signals abound. The judge struggles
throughout the trial to balance her obligation to explain procedural
requirements and make other allowances for the pro se litigant with her
obligation to maintain an impartial forum for both parties. She explains
some procedural issues at length (though remains unsure about the
extent to which the litigant truly understands), while on others she
“tempers or overlooks”151 her preferential treatment of the pro se litigant
in an effort to be fair to the opposing party’s lawyer. She finds the
balancing act unnecessarily irritating. On review, the appellate court
determines that while her efforts to guide the pro se litigant do not
amount to plain error, she should have provided the litigant a “more
149. Id. at 1269–70.
150. The hypothetical that follows is based very loosely on Azimi v. Johns, 254
P.3d 1054 (Alaska 2011), where the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed a superior
court’s decision with respect to whether, inter alia, the trial court judge was
adequately attentive to the needs of the pro se litigant. The description of the
litigant as “educated and articulate”—important at trial for determining the
ability of the litigant to understand the procedural requirements he was under—
is found at p. 1066.
151. See Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 2 n.2 for the view that a judge,
suspecting undisclosed assistance from an attorney for a pro se litigant, will
temper or “overlook[]” any preferential treatment to the pro se party in the
interest of fairness.
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complete” explanation of the proper procedures.152
The burden on judicial discretion in these situations is real enough
and cannot be adequately addressed by more explicit guidance from the
supreme court. Given differences among individual pro se litigants and
the cases they bring, the supreme court seems to have decided that the
regime of Breck modified by Bauman is as clear as the guidance for
judicial discretion can become without unduly hampering it with more
specific rules.153 Much is at stake in the judge’s exercise of discretion,
both for the judge’s effort to do justice on the merits and for the pro se
litigant. As the foregoing examination has suggested, the first
impressions created by a pro se litigant’s ghostwritten pleadings may
influence the judge’s efforts throughout the subsequent litigation
process. The judge’s potential mischaracterization of the litigant’s
sophistication may lead her to draw back the amount of guidance she
provides in a way that ultimately harms the litigant’s chances of success.
Requiring attorneys who assist otherwise pro se litigants to disclose
their assistance is not a comprehensive solution to the challenges
confronting judges managing pro se litigants. Such a disclosure will not,
for instance, enable a judge accurately to determine how much a pro se
litigant truly understands, and thus to judge whether the litigant’s
inadequate efforts and explanations are evasive tactics or good faith
failures. Disclosure will, however, ensure that the judge exercises her
discretionary effort to balance solicitude and impartiality in a situation
where all of the relevant variables are clear. The judge will not be
confronted with conflicting signals about a pro se litigant’s actual
understanding of his claims and the requirements he is under, nor will
the judge be required to guess about the sources of a litigant’s
knowledge.

IV. ATTORNEY GHOSTWRITING: HIGH COST, LOW REWARD
One of the most poignant retorts against critics of ghostwriting is
that they fail to identify any particular harm that the practice causes to
152. See Azimi, 254 P.3d at 1062 (“We agree that the superior court could have
provided Azimi with a more complete explanation of the proper procedure . . .
[but] we hold that any deficiency in the court’s explanation was harmless.”).
153. Though this is speculation, it is reasonable to infer this conclusion from
the fact that, in Tracy v. State, Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs., 279 P.3d 613, 617
(Alaska 2012), where the court requested supplemental briefing on the proper
extent of a judge’s required solicitude for the needs of a pro se litigant, the court
simply reiterated the Breck and Bauman standards to justify its determination
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by declining to advise plaintiffs
on what steps they might have taken to amend their complaint to name a proper
defendant.
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the legal profession or the administration of justice.154 The genius of the
retort is that it shifts the burden of justification to critics of ghostwriting.
For many years, most lawyers have assumed that this kind of disclosure
is required by ARPC 3.3 concerning “candor to the tribunal,” or under
the duty of honesty imposed by ARPC 1.2(d), 4.1, or 8.4(c).155 As a more
general matter, most lawyers assume that norms of disclosure and
transparency are deeply embedded in the practice of law, subject only to
the duty of protecting a client’s confidences or secrets.156 Until recently,
few lawyers would have agreed that an attorney’s participation in
aspects of an ongoing litigation should be concealed from the court.157
The previous sections of this Note have attempted to take seriously
the demand by proponents of ghostwriting that its critics identify the
harms associated with the practice. The argument thus far has suggested
that ghostwriting (1) undermines the transparency that allows the courts
and other lawyers to monitor for abuses of the rules of professional
conduct, and (2) potentially impairs the efforts of judges to address the
needs of pro se litigants. The argument is to some extent speculative,
concerned with a future in which unbundled services and pro se
litigation are an even greater part of legal practice in the United States.
In this respect, however, the argument is on par with most defenses of
ghostwriting. The suggested benefits of allowing ghostwriting for lowincome pro se litigants are also largely speculative.158 Most defenses of
ghostwriting essentially claim that because the practice has not yet
produced any real harm, it should be permitted to continue because it

154. See generally Jona Goldschmidt, An Analysis of Ghostwriting Decisions: Still
Searching for the Elusive Harm, 95 JUDICATURE 78, 10 (2011) (noting “the lack of
documented harm to adverse parties in ghostwriting decisions” and the “lack of
published cases of documented harm or adversary disadvantage from
ghostwriting”).
155. ALASKA R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3. See also ALASKA R. OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client to engage in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); ALASKA R. OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (mandating that a lawyer shall not falsely state material
facts or law or “fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting” a client’s criminal or fraudulent act); ALASKA R. OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (stating that conduct “involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or
misrepresentation” constitute acts of professional misconduct).
156. See ALASKA R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (requiring lawyers to protect
client confidences and secrets, unless a client provides informed consent, or the
disclosure is necessary to prevent harm, crime, fraud, or injury).
157. But see ABA Op. 07-446, supra note 39, at 3 (noting that since no
reasonable concern exists that a pro se litigant will receive an unfair advantage
from “behind-the-scenes” legal assistance, such aid is “immaterial and need not
be disclosed”).
158. See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 13 (mentioning evidence that unbundled
services in general are providing no demonstrable benefit to pro se litigants).
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might improve the prospects of low-income litigants. ABA Op. 07-446
justifies ghostwriting primarily on the idea that it is immaterial to the
merits of the litigation and will not provide a pro se litigant an undue
advantage.159 The ABA opinion does not, however, seem concerned—as
several of the Florida judges were160—that ghostwriting will provide
cover for incompetent, predatory practices by lawyers who sell their
services to low-income individuals and then provide them ineffective
assistance.
For the defense of ghostwriting to be fully persuasive, proponents
must not simply argue that it is immaterial or innocuous, but actually
explain what ghostwriting promises to contribute to the larger
aspiration of unbundled services. The defense of ghostwriting can no
longer simply be a defense of the basic idea of unbundled services. As
noted above, the Alaska debate over unbundled services has been
settled in its favor. The question that needs to be addressed is whether
ghostwriting adds anything of value to the practice that can outweigh
the potential costs. There is no evidence, for instance, that states
permitting ghostwriting have a larger number of attorneys providing
unbundled or pro bono services. More generally, ghostwriting fosters an
atmosphere of suspicious motives. An attorney who refuses to provide
limited services unless it is undisclosed would at least seem to be trying
to create a situation in which he cannot be held accountable for the
quality of his work. Similarly, a client who wants the services of an
attorney to remain confidential seems to be trying to game the system by
seeking the supposed advantages of proceeding pro se.
Goldschmidt has identified eight reasons why attorneys or their
clients may want to conceal their relationship from the court and
opposing counsel.161 Framing these concerns in relation to a purported
right to confidentiality, he argues that ghostwriting would be
appropriate:
(1) where an attorney is a friend of both the pro se litigant and
his divorcing spouse or other adversary in a civil dispute; (2)
where the attorney may not want the adverse publicity
from
public knowledge that he represents a particularly unpopular
pro se client; (3) where the pro se client knows that the judge in
the case and his ghostwriting attorney do not have a good
relationship, and he does not want the disclosure to adversely

159. ABA Op. 07-446, supra note 39, at 3.
160. See Cofer Letter, supra note 82 (highlighting the danger of attorneys
involving themselves in cases in a limited manner, which can result in pro se
litigants misconstruing or misapplying attorney advice).
161. Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1198.
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affect his case; (4) where the attorney who provides
ghostwriting services because he is sympathetic to pro se
litigants seeks to avoid ostracism for that service by members
of his bar association or judges with anti-pro se attitudes; (5)
where the attorney wants to assist the pro se client, but does
not want to get involved in the matter because opposing
counsel is particularly uncivil or a user of hardball tactics that
he fears will lengthen the litigation needlessly; (6) where the
attorney knows his client will not have the funds to litigate the
case fully and he wants to avoid being forced to stay in the case
by a judge who may decide that, once he appears, his
withdrawal motion should be denied; (7) where the attorney is
employed by a private company or non-profit organization and
wants to assist a pro se friend in a legal matter, but does not
want his employer to know that he is representing the pro se
litigant on his own time; (8) where the attorney may not desire
to appear before the assigned judge because of a problem with
him in the past, he knows that if he appears and files a notice of
substitution of judge the other side will do the same thing, and
the third judge may be worse than the first, so—given the
client’s ability to pay—ghostwriting and coaching the litigant
may be in the client’s best interest.162
All of these reasons are understandable concerns. Some are based
on personal conflicts of interest (not amounting to concerns under ARCP
1.7), others on a lawyer’s concern with the public perception of his work.
However understandable these reasons are for causing particular
lawyers in particular situations to be reticent about becoming involved
with a specific pro se client, none of them are adequate justifications for
permitting ghostwriting as a general policy. None of these situations—if
addressed by a general policy of allowing ghostwriting—promises to
increase the number of attorneys providing unbundled or pro bono
services.

CONCLUSION
Alaska Op. 93-1 justifies ghostwriting as a way of enabling lawyers
to serve more low-income individuals that is harmless for the judiciary’s
effort to manage an impartial and effective forum for justice.163 There is
no evidence that ghostwriting increases the number of attorneys
providing unbundled legal services or makes providing those services

162. Id.
163. Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1.
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any easier. Similarly, there is no evidence that ghostwriting improves
the prospects of pro se litigants once they are in court. This Note has
argued that ghostwriting confuses the interaction between pro se
litigants and judges in a way that potentially works against the pro se
party’s interests.
Given the marginal contribution, if any, that ghostwriting makes to
legal services, the Alaska Bar Association should revise its ethical
guidance to require that any attorney-assisted filing submitted by an
otherwise pro se litigant be identified as such. The Alaska Bar
Association could follow the Florida Bar Association’s lead and require
that attorneys who provide such services append “Prepared with the
Assistance of Counsel, Alaska Bar No. _____.” Requiring attorneys to
identify their work products in this manner would neither discourage
them from assisting pro se clients nor stifle experimentation in the
unbundled services market. What such disclosure would do is
incentivize quality legal work because it would preserve and protect
crucial forms of oversight and accountability. This disclosure would also
help the Alaska legal community monitor for abuses so that the quality
of legal representation for low-income, pro se litigants is consistent with
that offered to the beneficiaries of more traditional representation.

